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Warren v. Colombo: North Carolina Recognizes
Claim for Enhanced Injury
North Carolina historically has hesitated to effect change in tort law. The
courts' and legislature's reluctance to join the mainstream of American jurisprudence is illustrated by their refusal to embrace strict products liability or confine
the contributory negligence defense. 1 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
broke from that conservative tradition in 1989 by recognizing a cause of action
for enhanced injuries. The court in Warren v. Colombo,2 in step with the majority of courts that have addressed the issue, 3 held that a manufacturer may be

liable for enhanced injuries caused by negligent design and manufacture of a
product.4
i. A vast majority of states recognize the doctrine of strict liability in product liability cases.
63 Am. JuR. 2D ProductsLiability § 537 (1984). Only North Carolina, Delaware, Massachusetts,
and Michigan refuse to apply strict liability in tort. Id. at § 538. Contributory negligence remains a
complete bar to plaintiff's recovery only in North Carolina, Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, and
Virginia. 57A Am. JUR. 2D Negligence § 856, at 753 n.62 (1989).
2. 93 N.C. App. 92, 377 S.E.2d 249 (1989).
3. 2 Am. LAW OF PROD. LIAB. § 29:1, at 7 (3d ed. 1987); see, e.g., Faries v. Atlas Truck Body
Mfg. Co., 797 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Missouri law); Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546
F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (applying District of Columbia law); Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d
82 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Louisiana law); Stueve v. American Honda Motor Co., 457 F. Supp.
740 (D. Kan. 1978) (applying Kansas law); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975) (applying New Jersey law),judgment vacatedand remandedon othergrounds, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976);
Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 98 F.R.D. 36 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (applying Pennsylvania law); Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Cota v. Harley Davidson, Div. of AMF,
Inc., 141 Ariz. 7, 684 P.2d 888 (1984); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398,
131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305 (1978); Ford Motor Co. v.
Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1981); Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d
734 (1968); Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460 (1978); Jackson v. Warrum, 535
N.E.2d 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d
737 (1974); Smith v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978); Elsasser v. American Motors Corp., 81 Mich. App. 379, 265 N.W.2d 339 (1978); Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So. 2d
213 (1985 Miss.); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268
(1973); Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831 (1974); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33
N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225
N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568
(1981); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87
S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973);
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979); Baumgardner v. American Motors
Co., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974); D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890
(1983); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978). But see McClung v. Ford Motor
Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971) (applying West Virginia law) (no liability for injuries or
death caused by a defect that did not cause the accident itself), aff'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
4. Warren, 93 N.C. App. at 102, 377 S.E.2d at 255. At the time this Note went to press, the
North Carolina Supreme Court was preparing to address the viability of enhanced injury claims
based on the theories of negligence and breach of iniplied warranty of merchantability. In Melton v.
GeneralMotors Corp., the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile involved in a two car collision.
Appellant's Brief at 2, Melton v. General Motors Corp., (No. 23PA90), cert. granted, - N.C. -,

389 S.E.2d 815 (1990). The accident rendered the plaintiff a paraplegic. Id. Plaintiff

filed suit

against the driver of the other vehicle and General Motors, the manufacturer of the vehicle in which
he was a passenger. Id. He alleged, among other things, that the vehicle in which he was riding was
"negligently designed... by General Motors in that [it] was not equipped with shoulder harnesses
for rear seat occupants which subjected plaintiff... to unreasonable risk of enhanced injuries." Id.
at 3. The trial court granted General Motor's motion to dismiss pursuant to North Carolina Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. This Note assumes that the North Carolina Supreme Court will follow
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This Note begins with a discussion of the court's reasoning in Warren and
explains basic enhanced-injury theory by examining the development of the
cause of action in other jurisdictions. It then focuses on the practical implications of the Warren court's decision, specifically, the scope of the cause of action,
the plaintiff's burden of proving both causation and apportionment of damages,
and available defenses. The Note concludes that the Warren court's recognition
of enhanced-injury theory is sound and then attempts to provide guidance to
trial judges who will delineate the scope of the duty, burdens of proof, and
defenses.
On May 31, 1985, near Snow Hill, North Carolina, a tractor-trailer truck
5
crossed the center lane of a highway and struck the left side of a school bus.
The collision killed six young children and the driver of the truck and injured
several others. 6 The administrator of the estate of Robert Warren, one of the
children killed, brought suit against Michael Colombo, executor of the estate of
Mr. Conger, the truck driver; Mr. Conger's employer, Military Distributors of

Virginia, Inc.; and Thomas Built Buses, Inc., manufacturer of the school bus.7
Plaintiff alleged, among other things,8 that negligent bus design and manufacture by Thomas Built caused more severe injuries than plaintiff would have suffered in the crash if the bus had been properly designed. 9 The trial court

dismissed this claim against Thomas Built for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.10
A divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed with plain-

tiff that a cause of action for enhanced injuries is permissible under North Carolina law and reversed the trial court's dismissal of the claim against Thomas
Built. 1 The court first addressed the question of a manufacturer's duty to design

reasonably safe products under North Carolina law. Relying on Corprew v.
Chemical Corp., 12 the court stated that a manufacturer may be liable for injuries
the lead of the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Warren v. Colombo and recognize the
theory of enhanced injury.
5. Warren, 93 N.C. App. at 92, 377 S.E.2d at 250.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 92-93, 377 S.E.2d at 250. In addition to Warren, six other plaintiffs sued Thomas
Built Buses, Inc. for enhancement of their injuries. See Mumford v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 107,
377 S.E.2d 258 (1989) (enhanced injuries); Mumford v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 109, 377 S.E.2d 265
(1989) (enhanced injuries resulting in death); Corbitt v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 111, 377 S.E.2d 259
(1989) (enhanced injuries); Corbitt v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 113, 377 S.E.2d 262 (1989) (enhanced
injuries resulting in death); Albritton v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 115, 377 S.E.2d 264 (1989) (enhanced injuries resulting in death); Holmes v. Colombo, 93 N.C. App. 117, 377 S.E.2d 261 (1989)
(enhanced injuries). The court of appeals applied its holding in Warren and remanded these cases on
the issue of enhanced injury.
8. Warren, 93 N.C. App. at 92-93, 377 S.E.2d at 250. In addition to these claims, plaintiff
alleged negligence by Mr. Conger and his employer, Military Distributors of Virginia, Inc., and
breach of implied warranty by Thomas Built. Id. at 93, 377 S.E.2d at 250. Plaintiff also sought
punitive damages from Mr. Conger's estate and Military Distributors of Virginia, Inc. Id. These
claims were not at issue on appeal.

9. Id.
10. Id. The trial court also dismissed claims against Thomas Built for strict liability and punitive damages. Id. The court of appeals affirmed dismissal of these claims. Id. at 102, 377 S.E.2d at
255.
11. Id. at 102-03, 377 S.E.2d at 255-56.
12. 271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
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13
caused by a negligently designed product that is unsafe for its intended use.
Although the court recognized that the manufacturer is not under a duty to
produce a crashproof vehicle, it found that every manufacturer is required to
design and manufacture a reasonably safe product that will minimize injury in
the event of impact.14

Turning to the element of breach of this duty to design safe products, the
court found plaintiff's allegations against Thomas Built sufficient to survive the
motion to dismiss.15 Plaintiff alleged that Thomas Built failed to pad the seats
adequately or secure them to the floor of the bus; constructed seats with material
too weak to withstand reasonably foreseeable impacts; used metal tubing that
broke easily, becoming sharp and dangerous; constructed the exterior siding of
the bus with materials unable to withstand reasonably foreseeable impacts; and
16
failed to provide seat belts for the bus passengers.
The bulk of the court's opinion focused on the issue of proximate cause. 17
The court looked to joint tortfeasor principles for guidance in resolving the question whether the "first impact" is the sole proximate cause in vehicular collision
cases.18 Relying on the well-settled principle that injury may result from more
than one proximate cause, 19 the court concluded that different factors may pro20
duce the initial injury and cause its enhancement.
While acknowledging the difficult questions concerning apportionment of
damages awaiting the trial court, the court expressly declined to address the
issue of damages and summarily concluded that plaintiff's allegations of damages were sufficient to withstand defendant's motion to dismiss. 21 Explaining
that denial of a cause of action for enhanced injury "would result in the possible
insulation of negligent parties from responsibility in a situation in which the
initial event would have caused only minor injuries absent the event causing
enhanced injuries," the court remanded the case to the trial court solely on the
22
issue of enhanced injuries.

13. Warren, 93 N.C. App. at 97, 377 S.E,2d at 252.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 97-98, 377 S.E.2d at 252-53.
16. Id.
17. North Carolina case law defines proximate cause as "a cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced the plaintiff's injuries, and
without which the injuries would not have occurred, and one from which a person of ordinary
prudence could have reasonably foreseen that such a result ... was probable." Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 310 N.C. 227, 233, 311 S.E.2d 559, 565 (1984).
18. Warren, 93 N.C. App. at 100, 377 S.E.2d at 254.
19. See Adams v. Mills, 312 N.C. 181, 194, 322 S.E.2d 164, 172 (1984); Hairston, 310 N.C, at
234, 311 S.E.2d at 565-66; Batts v. Faggart, 260 N.C. 641, 644, 133 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1963); Warren
v. Parks, 31 N.C. App. 609, 615, 230 S.E.2d 684, 688 (1976).
20. Warren, 93 N.C. App. at 101, 377 S.E.2d at 254.
21. Id. at 101, 377 S.E.2d at 254-55.
22. Id. at 101, 377 S.E.2d at 255. In Warren, the court specifically adopted the term "enhanced
injury" as opposed to "crashworthiness" or "second collision." Id. at 95, 377 S.E.2d at 251. Many
courts use the terms synonymously, but one commentator argues that such use "unintentionally
mask[s] the broad applicability of thd 'enhanced injury' concept." Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory:
An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C.L. REV. 643, 647-48 (1984). Claims for enhanced injuries are not
limited to situations involving automobiles. For example, such claims have been brought in cases
involving materials that when ignited gave off dangerous fumes, clothing that burned quickly, and
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Although concurring in the result, Judge Greene took issue with the major-

ity's view that recognition of plaintiff's claim required a new cause of action, and
instead argued that simple application of long-standing rules of negligence

would provide plaintiff with a remedy. 23 He wrote, "Plaintiff's attempt to establish joint and several liability for injuries allegedly caused by several tort-feasors

is a common practice and is governed by traditional principles of negligence." 24
The practical effect of classifying enhanced injury as a new cause of action
as opposed to applying traditional negligence principles is extremely significant.
Under traditional principles of concurrent liability, once the plaintiff establishes

a prima facie case that defendant's negligence contributed as a proximate cause
to plaintiff's injuries, the burden of proving apportionment rests on the defendants. 25 Apportionment is impossible when the injury is indivisible. 26 If the defendant is unable to prove divisibility and apportionment, then he is jointly and

severally liable for the entire damage award. If the trial court concludes that

27
damages can be apportioned, the jury must decide the actual apportionment.

While not expressly stating so, the majority opinion's characterization of enhanced injury as a new cause of action appears to require plaintiff,as part of his
prima facie case, to prove the extent of the enhancement and the proper appor28
tionment of the damages before he can recover.
Judge Arnold dissented from the majority's conclusion that plaintiff's
claims for enhanced injury stated a cause of action. 29 In accord with the distinct
minority of jurisdictions, Judge Arnold stated that under North Carolina law
only the "first impact" is a proximate cause of injuries in vehicular collision

cases. 30 He concluded that it is, therefore, impossible for a cause of action for
31
enhanced injury to exist.

Ile significance of North Carolina's acceptance of enhanced injury theory
in general, and specifically its characterization of it as a new cause of action, is
best understood in the'context of the cause of action's development in other
jurisdictions. 32 Liability for enhanced injury is "based on the premise that some
utility poles that did not give way upon impact. See generally Harris,supra, at 649-50 (listing situations in which a plaintiff may have a viable enhanced-injury claim).
23. Warren, 93 N.C. App. at 103-04, 377 S.E.2d at 256 (Greene, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 104, 377 S.E.2d at 256 (Greene, J.,
concurring).
25. Id. at 106, 377 S.E.2d at 257 (Greene, J.,
concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 433B(2) (1965); 1 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERiCAN LAW OF TORTS
§ 3:7, at 398 (1988)).
26. Id. at 105, 377 S.E.2d at 257 (Greene, J.,concurring) (citing Ipock v. Gilmore, 73 N.C.
App. 182, 186, 326 S.E.2d 271, 275, disa rev. denied, 314 N.C. 116, 332 S.E.2d 481 (1985); W.
PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 30, at 347 (5th ed. 1984)).
27. Id. at 106, 377 S.E.2d a 257 (Greene, J...
concurring).
28. See infra notes 59-87 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the burdens of proof
applied under each approach.
29. Warren, 93 N.C. App. at 106, 377 S.E.2d at 258 (Arnold, J.,
dissenting).
30. Id. (Arnold, J.,
dissenting).
31. Id. (Arnold, J., dissenting).
32. Federal courts, exercising diversity jurisdiction, have played a significant role in the development of enhanced-injury theory. Harris, supra note 22, at 644; Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981);"Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978); Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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objects, while they are not made for the purpose of undergoing impact, should

designed to minimize the injury-producing effect of such conbe reasonably
tact."' 33 Prior to 1968, some jurisdictions rejected this type of claim and instead
adhered to a restrictive rule, limiting claims to situations in which the product
defect actually caused the accident. 34 In 1968, in the landmark case of Larsen v.

GeneralMotors Corp., 3- the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted a broader view that allowed a plaintiff to recover for enhanced
injuries caused by a negligently defective design. The court in Larsen held:
Where the manufacturer's negligence in design causes an unrea-

sonable risk to be imposed upon the user of its products, the manufacturer should be liable for the injury caused by its failure to exercise

reasonable care in the design.... No rational basis exists for limiting
recovery to situations where the defect in design or manufacture was
the causative factor of the accident, as the accident and the resulting
injury, . . . all are foreseeable.. . . At least, the unreasonable risk

should be eliminated and reasonable steps
in design taken to minimize
36
the injury-producing effect of impacts.

Enhanced-injury cases require the plaintiff to prove the same basic elements
involved in other product liability cases. 37 The essential elements of a product
liability action asserted under negligence theory are: 1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff 2) a breach of that duty; 3) injury directly or proximately

caused by that breach; and 4) damage resulting from that injury, 38 The problematic issues are the scope of the duty and the proper burdens of proof of causation
39
and apportionment of damages.
Often ftderal courts have had to predict rather than apply states' legal principles. Harris, supra note
22, at 645. The federal courts' attempts to predict North Carolina law illustrate the unauthoritative
and speculative nature of this practice. The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey predicted that North Carolina courts would adopt strict liability in tort and allow recovery for
enhanced injuries. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.) (summarizing
proceedings in district court), cert denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981). While the appeal was pending,
however, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to adopt the doctrine of strict liability. See
Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 678, 268 S.E.2d 504, 510 (1980). Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Seese affirmed the district court's judgment. Scese, 648
F.2d at 835. While admitting that submitting strict liability to the jury was improper, the circuit
court affirmed on the basis that, even though North Carolina rejected strict liability, it would allow a
"crashworthiness claim." Id. at 837, 841. The Fourth Circuit subsequently rendered its own prediction that North Carolina would not allow recovery for enhanced injuries, Wilson v. Ford Motor
Co., 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
33. Harris, supra note 22, at 646.
34. See, eg., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966), overruled in Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Indiana
law), Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp. 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969), overruled in Toliver v. General
Motors Corp., 482 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1985); Ford v. Rupple, 161 Mont. 56, 504 P.2d 686 (1972).
This. is the position adopted by Judge Arnold in his dissenting ojpinion in Warren. L!ee supra notes
29-31 and accompanying text.
35. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
36. Id. at 502-03.
37. Harris, supra note 22, at 651; Note, Enhanced Injury: A Direction for Washington, 61
WASH. L Rav. 571, 575 (1986).

38. City of Thomasville v. Lease-Alex, Inc., 300 N.C. 651, 656, 268 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1980); W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 26, at 164-65.
39. See Harris, supra note 22, at 646, 651-52; Note, supra note 37, at 576.
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Although the manufacturer's duty to act reasonably to minimize the injuries that result when their product confronts hazardous situations is conceptually simple,4° courts have difficulty defining the scope of the duty. 4 1 It is clear
that products do not have to be absolutely safe.42 For example, in cases involving automobiles, courts have not held manufacturers to a duty to provide vehicles that are "crash proof,"43 that "float on water," 44 that would tolerate a
"head on collision with a large truck at high speed," 45 that would endure a
collision with "a 114-ton locomotive engine traveling at 45 miles per hour," 46 or
that possess the "strength and crash-damage resistance features of an M-2 Army
tank."'' a Courts should hesitate to find a duty in cases involving accidents "so
devastating, remote or bizarre" as to be outside both the intended use of the
object and the reasonably foreseeable results of normal use.48 Judge Orr's justification of enhanced-injury theory as a means of preventing the "insulation of
negligent parties... in a situation where the initial event would have caused
only minor injuries absent the event causing enhanced injuries" 49 suggests that
there may be cases in which the initial impact is so great and the resulting injuries so devastating that it would be inappropriate for the trial judge to impose a
duty upon the manufacturer.
While the foreseeability of injurious contact is necessary, it is not by itself
sufficient to create a duty to prevent that injury.50 In Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A. G.,51 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit warned
against overly broad application of foreseeability and unreasonable risk, stating:
Foreseeability ... is not to be equated with duty; it is, after all, but
one factor, albeit an important one, to be weighed in determining the
issue of duty .... The key phrase... is 'unreasonable risk of injury in
the event of a collision,' not foreseeability of collision.. .. 'Whether or
not this has occurred should be determined by general negligence prin40. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981).
41. Harris, supra note 22, at 652.
42. Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 245; Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th
Cir. 1974); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).

43. Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 247; Dreisonstok, 489 F.2d at 1070; Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503; see also
Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1978) (jury instructed that manufacturer not
"duty-bound to design an accident-proof or foolproof vehicle or a vehicle incapable of producing
injury"); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976) (manufacturer not "required to design

against bizarre accidents" nor "to produce an accident-proof vehicle"). See generally Harris,supra
note 22, at 652-54 (discussing scope of duty in enhanced-injury cases).
44. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502.
45. Dreisonstok, 489 F.2d at 1073.
46. Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 346 F. Supp. 320, 327 (W.D.N.C. 1971). In this
case involving a collision between a train and an automobile the court applied North Carolina law
and rejected the Larsen rule outright, stating that "if the American people are to travel in Sherman
tanks, the Congress and not the courts, should decree it." Id. Collision with a train does not automatically preclude a claim for enhanced injury, however. See Li Puma v. County of Rockland, 81
Misc. 2d 988, 991, 367 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152-53 (1975) (trial court stated that whether defects in school
bus caused enhanced injury when bus struck by train is issue for jury).
47. Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 85, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (1978).
48. Harris, supra note 22, at 654.
49. Warren, 93 N.C. App. at 101, 377 S.E.2d at 255 (emphasis added).
50. Harris, supra note 22, at 654.
51. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying Virginia negligence law).
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ciples, which involve a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the
gravity of harm if it happens against the burden
of the precautions
52
which would be effective to avoid the harm.'
When evaluating a product for defective design, the trier of fact should

consider the product's "inherent characteristics, its price, and the circumstances
of the accident."'5 3 Only when these factors are considered in the aggregate can
54
the court determine if the manufacturer owed a duty to the plaintiff.
Courts adopting enhanced-injury theory generally accept the limitations
placed on plaintiffs' ability to recover from a manufacturer as set forth in
Larsen:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer
should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the
defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably
would have occurred
as a result of the impact or collision absent the
55
defective design.
Courts, however, disagree as to whether enhanced-injury claims are distinct
57
causes of action 56 or within the principles of traditional negligence actions.
The characterization adopted determines the essential elements of the prima facie enhanced-injury case and also determines which party bears the burden of
58
proving causation and enhancement.
Courts, like the Warren court, that consider enhanced injury claims as separate from orthodox negligence actions require plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence three elements: 1) breach of a duty; 2) the breach caused
enhancement of injuries beyond that which would have occurred absent the
breach; and 3) the extent to which the breach enhanced the damage. 5 9 In contrast, jurisdictions that opt to fit enhanced injury into traditional joint tortfeasor
and concurrent negligence principles, as would the concurrence in Warren, do
52. Id. at 1070-71.
53. Harris, supra note 22, at 656 (citing Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 779 (10th Cir,
1978); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 740-41 (3d Cir. 1976); Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d
634, 636 (5th Cir. 1975); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir.

1974); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 783 (1975). The
court held in Huddell that "the 'relative severity of the impact' goes to the heart of the issue of

defectiveness in terms of the 'ordinary purposes' for which the product

... was designed."

Huddell,

537 F.2d at 740.
54. Note, supra note 37, at 578.

55. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968),
56. See Huddell, 537 F.2d at 742. This appears to be the approach adopted by the majority
opinion in Warren. See supra notes 11-22 & 28 and accompanying text.

57. See Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1207 (8th Cir. 1982); Fox v. Ford
Motor Corp., 575 F.2d 774, 787 (10th Cir. 1978). This is the approach espoused by the concurring
opinion in Warren. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.

58. Harris, supra note 22, at 657. See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text (discussion of
the different requirements for a prima facie case).
59. Harris, supra note 22, at 657. For other decisions adhering to this view, see Curtis v,General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 1981); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d
241, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1981); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 621 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1980);
Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1978); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d

726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976).
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not require that plaintiff establish the third element. 6° Clearly this latter approach increases plaintiff's chances of recovery.
In Huddell v. Levin 6 ' the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit stated, "[u]nlike orthodox products liability or negligence litigation,
crashworthy or second collision cases impugning the design of an automobile
require a highly refined and almost invariably difficult presentation of proof."62
The court held that the plaintiff first has to establish design defectiveness by
offering proof of a safer alternative design. 63 Next, the plaintiff must establish
which injuries would have occurred if the alternative design had been in effect.64
Finally, the plaintiff has to show the extent of injury enhancement caused by the
defective design. 65 Critics argue that such a heavy burden may result in plaintiffs' defeat in cases in which apportionment is impossible or extraordinarily ex-

pensive. 66 On the other hand, if the manufacturer is to be liable only for those
damages over and above those that would have occurred absent the manufacturer's breach, the court should require plaintiff to come forward with this
proof.67 Further, if a plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proof on enhancement,
not only has he simply "failed to establish[] his prima facie case... that it is
more probable than not that the alleged defect aggravated or enhanced the injuries resulting from the initial collision," but he also has failed to "establish the
''
fact of enhancement at all. 68

A minority of courts has rejected the unique burden-of-proof scheme established in Huddell on public policy grounds. 69 In Fox v. FordMotor Co. 70 the
court rejected the Huddell approach and placed the burden of apportionment on
the defendant.7 1 According to the Fox court, the plaintiff's burden of proof in
enhanced-injury cases is the same as in other tort cases. 72 In Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. 73 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
followed Fox and found that placing the burden on the plaintiff would put "vic60. The leading cases representing this approach are Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669
F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law) and Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th
Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law).
61. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
62. Id. at 737.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 738. Other courts have followed suit and elevated the plaintiff's burden of proof in

enhanced-injury cases. See Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1978); Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co.,
540 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1976).
66. Note, supra note 37, at 583.
67. Harris, supra note 22, at 658.
68. Cafazzo, 647 F.2d at 251.
69. See, eg., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985); Richardson v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Mo. 1982); General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482

So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985); Jackson v. Warrum, 535 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind.Ct. App. 1989); Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 688 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1984); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984); Harris, supra note 22, at 658; Note, supra note 37, at 583.
70. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
71. Id. at 787.

72. Id.
73. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
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tim[s] [in] an almost hopeless state of never being able to succeed against a defective designer." 74 The Mitchell court relied on orthodox tort principles,
stating:
Plaintiff's burden of proof [is] satisfied... if it is shown that the
design defect was a substantial factor in producing damages over and
above those.., probably caused [by the] original impact or collision.
[The] extent of the manufacturer's liability depends upon whether or

not the injuries involved are divisible ....

[A]bsent a reasonable basis

the defendto determine which wrongdoer actually caused the harm,
75

ants should be treated as joint and several tortfeasors.
Commentators criticize this approach as inconsistent. 76 As explained by
the Huddell court, the doctrine of joint liability of concurrent tortfeasors is not
applicable to enhanced-injury cases, as these cases do not involve concurrent
actions that result in double fault for the same occurrence. 77 If the theoretical
bases for the cause of action are to be respected, the manufacturer can only be
liable for the enhanced injury, not the entire injury, as joint and several liability
principles require. 78 The Fox and Mitchell courts' reliance on the principles of
joint and several liability set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts is inconsistent with the "theoretical underpinnings of crashworthiness liability" estab79
lished by Larsen.
By characterizing enhanced injury as a new cause of action, the Warren
court implies that in North Carolina a plaintiff will have to prove the extent to
which the manufacturer's negligence enhanced the injury. North Carolina
courts still must resolve the tension between the desire to allow meritorious
claims to succeed and the need to avoid faulty and inconsistent analysis such as
that displayed in Fox and Mitchell.80 Crucial to resolving this tension is deciding
upon the method and amount of proof courts will require before finding that the
plaintiff has met her burden.8 1 One commentator has stated that in order to
prove the three elements in an enhanced injury case, the plaintiff's evidence
must enable the trier of fact to find a breach by the defendant, evaluate the entire
amount of injury suffered by the plaintiff, determine the severity of the initial
impact to the object and to the plaintiff after initial impact, define the alternative
designs that the defendant should have employed, determine the extent of the
injuries that the plaintiff hypothetically would have suffered absent the defect,
and calculate the monetary difference between the hypothetical injuries plaintiff
74. Id. at 1204.

75. Id. at 1206.
76. See Levenstam and Lapp, Plaintiff'sBurden ofProvingEnhancedInjury in Crashworthiness
Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DE PAUL L. REv. 55, 82 (1989); Harris, supra note 22, at
659.
77. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976).
78. Id.
79. Harris, supra note 22, at 659-60 n. 119. See Levenstam, supra note 76, at 82.
80. Harris, supra note 22, at 659.
81. Id. at 659-60. To mitigate the potentially harsh effects of the Huddle requirements many
courts that place the burden on the plaintiff have found the burden met so long as plaintiff offers

some quantified estimate of enhancement. Note, supra note 37, at 584 nn.91-92 (collecting cases).

TORT LAW

1990"]

1339

82
would have suffered absent the defect and the injuries actually sustained.

Expert testimony will play an important role in a plaintiff's efforts to estab-

lish a prima facie case of enhancement.8 3 Plaintiffs should present testimony

concerning accident reconstruction and alternative designs to assist the trier of

fact. 84 In addition, experts' conclusions regarding the character and degree of
damages the plaintiff would have suffered absent the defendant's breach will en-

able the trier of fact to determine the hypothetical damages issue. 85 Once the

plaintiff has offered evidence, even though imprecise, to support the occurrence

of enhancement, the court should submit the claim to the jury.86 This burden is
difficult, but does strike a balance between the interests of the plaintiff and the
87

defendant.

The difficulty of proof and societal considerations support this approach to
the amount and exactitude of proof required.88 It is impossible to prove how a

product will respond in given situations and what physical injury a given individual is likely to suffer.89 Consequently, estimates are often purely specula-

tive. 90 Given that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant caused some
enhancement of injuries before the issue of apportionment arises, it is fair to
allow a plaintiff to recover even if his proof is not precise rather than to allow a

decidedly negligent defendant to escape all liability. 9 1 At the same time, courts
must be mindful that if, as a result of rules of apportionment that heavily favor
plaintiffs, manufacturers are held liable for injuries not caused by the defects,

82. See Harris,supra note 22, at 659-60; Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245,
251 (2d Cir. 1982); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1978); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d
1066, 1074 (4th Cir. 1974).
83. Harris, supra note 22, at 660-63.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 663. The North Carolina Rules of Evidence provide that "[tiestimony in the form of
an opinion or inference is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact." N.C.R. EviD. 704.
86. Harris, supra note 22, at 664. Establishing enhancement proves that the defendant caused
injuries greater than those that the plaintiff otherwise would have sustained. Id. at 663 n.150. As
the court in Larsen stated, even if the extent of enhancement cannot be determined with precision, a
defendant nevertheless should be liable and the plaintiff should not be "abandon[ed] ... to his dismal
fate." Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
Juries have made equally inexact decisions in setting awards in cases involving pain and suffering, wrongful death cases involving projected lifetime earnings of children, condemnation awards,
and lost profits suits. Harris, supra note 22, at 664-65.
87. Harris, supra note 22, at 663-65.
88. Note, supra note 37, at 591-92.
89. See Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd in

part on other grounds, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
90. See, eg., Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1976) (expert testimony that plaintiff's face struck the exposed prongs of horn assembly with 100
times greater force than if she had struck only the surface of the horn cap held sufficient evidence of
enhancement); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976)
(court found sufficient expert testimony that absence of head restraint exposed plaintiff to a cranial
impact 16 times greater than that which would have occurred with a head restraint); Engberg v.
Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973) (physics professor's testimony that lack of
internal damage to the vehicle indicated that if seat belt had functioned properly and kept the plaintiff in the car the extent of the injury would have been minor).
91. Note, supra note 37, at 592.
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they in effect become insurers, 92 a result contrary to the policy of traditional
North Carolina tort doctrine.
Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff is consistent with North Carolina's protective treatment of manufacturers in products liability cases and the
state's staunch adherence to contributory negligence as an absolute bar to a
plaintiff's recovery. It will be up to the trial courts to strike the proper balance
between the interests of the plaintiff and those of the manufacturer in deterinining what quality and quantity of proof is required before the jury is permitted to
apportion damages.
The availability of defenses in enhanced-injury cases is unsettled. North
Carolina's refusal to institute any form of comparative negligence system adds to
this uncertainty, as the modem trend in enhanced-injury cases is to "consolidate
products liability defenses and allow the unitary defense of comparative fault to
93
be asserted as an award-reducing, rather than absolute, defense."1
A plaintiff's contributory negligence in causing the initial impact should
not provide a defense to a claim for enhanced injuries.94 As the Larsen court
made clear, a primary purpose for allowing a claim of enhanced injury was to
recognize the certainty that injury-producing impacts occur. 95 Therefore, the
manufacturer has a duty to design a product that will minimize the injuries that
result from the impact, regardless of the cause.9 6 Nevertheless, some courts have
concluded that a plaintiff's negligence in causing the initial impact can act to bar
or reduce her recovery for the enhancement of her injuries. 9 7 In addition to
being theoretically unsound, a decision by the North Carolina courts to link a
plaintiff's contributory negligence in causing the initial accident to her ability to
recover for enhanced injuries would completely bar any recovery by the plaintiff,
a particularly harsh result.
Although the plaintiff's fault in causing the impact should not be considered a viable defense to his claim for enhanced injury, two other types of belavior may require a different result. First, if the plaintiff fails to repair a defect in
the product which later enhances his injury, that failure to repair should at least
reduce his recovery, if not preclude it completely. 98 Under North Carolina's
92. Id. at 590, 592; see Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1968).
93. Harris, supra note 22, at 672-73; see, Note, Litigating Enhanced Injury Cases: Complex
Issue& Empty Precedents,and UnpredictableResults, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1257, 1279 (1986).
94. Contributory negligence is defined as "negligence on the part of the plaintiff which joins,
simultaneously or successively, with the negligence of the defendant ...to produce the injury" to the

plaintiff. Jackson v. McBride, 270 N.C. 367, 372, 154 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1967). Further, a finding of
contributory negligence precludes any recovery based on the original negligence of the defendant,
Presnell v. Payne, 272 N.C. 11, 13, 157 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1967). Cases that have implicitly recognized that plaintiff's negligence in causing the initial accident is not a basis for denying or offsetting
his award include: Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 767 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo.App. 82, 86-87, 583 P.2d

305, 307 (1978).
95. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
96. Harris, supra note 22, at 674.
97. See, ag., Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 2d 288, 304-05, 336 A.2d 118, 127-28
(1975) (driver's negligence in causing the accident bars recovery for enhanced injuries).
98. Harris, supra note 22, at 674 n.200.
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contributory negligence doctrine such behavior by the plaintiff would absolutely
bar recovery. 99 Defendant, however, would have to prove that the plaintiff
knowingly and unreasonably encountered a known risk. 1°0 Second, the defendant should be able to assert as a defense the plaintiff's failure to employ the
product's safety devices. 10 1 It is in this context that the seat belt controversy

arises.
The North Carolina legislature has expressly prohibited the introduction of
a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt as evidence in any civil action. 10 2 This
rejection of the seat belt defense, however, fails to consider the difference between ordinary negligence cases and enhanced-injury cases.' 0 3 Prior to the enactment of the legislation, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Miller v.
Miller 104 held that plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt did not constitute contributory negligence.' 0 5 The court provided the following reasons for rejecting
the defense: 1) plaintiff has no duty to anticipate another's negligence; 10 6 2) it is
harsh to deny plaintiff any recovery when failure to wear the seat belt in no way
caused the accident; 10 7 3) the average person does not usually use seat belts;10 8
and 4) the court fears awards of conjectural damages. 109 Although these factors
may justify denying the seat belt defense in ordinary negligence actions, they do
not apply with equal force to enhanced-injury cases. First, a plaintiff's duty to
wear a seat belt and possibly mitigate her injuries mirrors the manufacturer's
duty to minimize injuries through safe product design. Further, the apparent

unfairness of denying plaintiff all recovery is absent in cases of enhanced injury
because the manufacturer likewise did not cause the accident to happen. 110
Next, the failure of a large number of people to use seat belts cannot excuse
everyone from doing so." 1 The fear of speculative damages is misplaced, partic99. See infra note 102.
100. See Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980) (plaintiff cannot
ignore unreasonable risks that ordinarily prudent person would recognize in exercise of due care for
own safety). But see Watts v. Schult Homes Corp. 75 N.C. App. 110, 330 S.E.2d 41 (judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for defendant not appropriate when plaintiff knew of leak onto breaker
box, but failed to disconnect the electricity which resulted in a fire destroying the mobile home,
because plaintiff had no knowledge that moisture could cause electrical fire), disc. rev. denied, 314
N.C. 548, 335 S.E.2d 320 (1985).
101. Note, supra note 93, at 1281; Harris, supra note 22, at 674.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A(d) (1989). This statute also makes it mandatory for front
seat occupants to use seat belts at all times during which the vehicle is moving forward. Id. at § 20135.2A(a). Violation of the statute is an infraction punishable by a fine of twenty-five dollars. Id. at
§ 20-135.2A(e).
103. Harris, supra note 22, at 677.
104. 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
105. Id. at 239-40, 160 S.E.2d at 74.
106. Id. at 234, 160 S.E.2d at 70.
107. Id. at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
108. Id. at 233, 160 S.E.2d at 69.
109. Id. at 240, 160 S.E.2d at 74.
110. Harris, supra note 22, at 679.
111. Id. at 680. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1968)
(stating that the "intended use and purpose of an automobile ... carry the possibility, probability,
and potential of injury producing impacts. The[se] realities ... are well known to the manufacturers
and to the public."). The fact that seat belt use is mandated by statute bolsters this argument. See
supra note 102 (describing statute).
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ularly in light of the fact that courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover for injuries suffered because seat belts failed. 112 Finally, "the availability of a safety
restraint system is highly probative of whether the product had the capacity to
113
offer reasonable protection against injury."
An exception to the statutory rejection of the seat belt defense is called for
in enhanced injury cases. Allowing a plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt to bar
completely any recovery for enhanced injuries would be consistent with North
Carolina's traditional contributory negligence doctrine. Such an approach is inconsistent with the public policy against denying a plaintiff damages based on
his failure to wear a seat belt which did not cause the accident, however. This
policy is illustrated by the legislature's prohibition of such evidence in civil
cases. A compromise approach would allow the defendant in enhanced ihjury
litigation to establish a presumption of contributory negligence by proving that
the plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident. The plaintiff
then could rebut the presumption by proving that even if she had been wearing a
seat belt, the design defect still would have resulted in enhanced injuries. The
plaintiff could only recover for those injuries over and above those which she
would have suffered if she had been wearing the belt. This approach would
avoid the harsh result of complete denial of recovery for injuries that the design
defect would have caused regardless of plaintiff's actions. Placing the burden of
proof on the plaintif, however, ensures a proper balance between the interests of
the plaintiff and the defendant.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals' recognition of enhanced-injury theory is a welcome expansion of existing tort doctrine. Trial courts will have to
answer many questions left unresolved by the Warren opinion. In attempting to
flesh out this new cause of action, the trial courts must be careful not to take an
overly expansive view of the scope of the manufacturer's duty. Further, the
courts should place the burden of proving the extent of enhancement and divisibility of the injuries on the plaintiff. The courts, however, should not require a
quantity and quality of proof that plaintiffs will find impossible to satisfy. A
plaintiff's contributory negligence in causing the initial accident should not provide a defense to a claim for enhanced injury. Finally, the legislature should
except from the blanket rejection of the seat belt defense cases involving enhanced-injury claims. If courts follow these guidelines, the recognition of enhanced injury as a new cause of action will provide a remedy to deserving
plaintiffs in a manner consistent with the traditional public policy against casting
manufacturers in the role of insurers.
KERRY A. SHAD

112. Harris, supra note 22, at 680. See Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d
104 (1973) (allowing recovery for enhanced injury resulting from seat belt that severed); Endicott v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 921, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 97 (1977) (jury allowed to consider enhanced-injury claim based on rupturing of seat belt).
113. Note, supra note 93, at 1282.

